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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FINDING THE CLUSTER: BALANCING PRIVACY AND PUBLIC
HEALTH AMID THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
ABSTRACT
More than 800,000 Americans have died and more than fifty-seven million
sickened since March 2020 from the COVID-19 virus and its highly contagious
variants. Public health officials urged the public to mask up, socially distance,
and stay home in order to curb the virus’ spread in the early months of the
pandemic before a vaccine was approved. Meanwhile, those same officials
blocked access to valuable information pinpointing areas of disease
concentration—“hotspots”—which could have alerted members of the public of
locations to avoid. Those officials generally—and usually incorrectly—cited the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) as grounds for
information blocking, likely to bypass liability if information released was not
properly de-identified under the law. While the secrecy may have caused
confusion and distrust among the general public, there is insufficient guidance
for health officials to determine which health-related data can and cannot be
shared. The Office for Civil Rights, housed under the federal Department of
Health and Human Services, sanctions HIPAA offenses, and thus can play a
uniquely influential role in access to public health information by issuing
guidance for health officials that explains HIPAA’s privacy rules and their
limitations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the middle of a war against an international pandemic which, by early
January 2022, had killed over 800,000 Americans and sickened more than fiftyseven million, 1 a new battleground emerged: the fight for access to public
information. 2 Since March 2020, and prior to the mass distribution of vaccines,
public health experts urged Americans to stay at home and socially distance to
help stop the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, or COVID-19. 3 In an effort to
alert Americans to areas of disease concentration, also called “hotspots,” 4 local
reporters pressed public health authorities for information to help identify
locations where the disease had rampantly spread. 5 Those reporters were joined
in their efforts by other members of the general public, including many parents
of school children who had also asked their local school districts to publicize
disease incidence information to make informed decisions about whether it was
safe to send their children to school. 6 These questions seem, at first glance,
uncontroversial. But as compliance with public health measures—masking,
social distancing, and staying home—became highly politicized under the
Trump Administration, 7 data which could help tamper the spread of the deadly
COVID-19 virus became harder to access. 8
1. United States COVID-19 Cases, Deaths, and Laboratory Testing (NAATs) by State,
Territory, and Jurisdiction, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://covid.cdc.gov/
covid-data-tracker/#cases_casesper100klast7days (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
2. See, e.g., Dan Levin, Covid in the Classroom? Some Schools Are Keeping It Quiet, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2020), https://nyti.ms/329CWFa.
3. See, e.g., Cal. Exec. Order No. N-33-20 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/3.19.20-attested-EO-N-33-20-COVID-19-HEALTH-ORDER.pdf;
Transcript for the CDC Telebriefing on the COVID-19 Outbreak, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/t1202-covid-19-tele
briefing.html.
4. Alexandra M. Oster et al., Trends in Number and Distribution of COVID-19 Hotspot
Counties—United States, March 8–July 15, 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.
1127, 1127 (2020).
5. Levin, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. P. Sol Hart et al., Politicization and Polarization in COVID-19 News Coverage, 42 SCI.
COMMC’N 679, 680–81 (2020); Anna North, Why Masks Are (Still) Politicized in America, VOX
(July 22, 2020, 10:45 AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/7/21/21331310/mask-masks-trump-covid
19-rule-georgia-alabama.
8. See, e.g., Brianne Pfannenstiel, Iowa Officials Won’t Disclose Coronavirus Outbreaks at
Meatpacking Plants Unless Media Asks, DES MOINES REG., https://www.desmoinesregister.com/
story/news/politics/2020/05/27/iowa-wont-disclose-covid-19-outbreaks-businesses-unless-mediaasks-kim-reynolds/5267413002/ (May 28, 2020, 6:41 AM). Some locales, including St. Louis
County, suspended their contact tracing efforts, highlighting the pressing need for public access to
COVID-19 hotspot information as mitigation measures fell primarily in the hands of patients.
Though the relevance of hotspot data will, hopefully, diminish as vaccine distribution slows the
spread of COVID-19, this issue may resurface in the next pandemic or public health emergency
due to a highly communicable disease. See Sarah Fentem, St. Louis County Set Record for
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In many cases, these data-keepers—public health agencies, hospitals, school
districts, and counties—are incorrectly citing health privacy laws as a means of
restricting access to hotspot information. 9 The federal health information
privacy law is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
Privacy Rule, enacted in 1996. 10 The rule prohibits covered entities, including
health plans, clearinghouses, and providers, from disclosing protected health
information (PHI) where such information is individually identifiable. 11
Business associates of covered entities, such as subcontractors, are also
prohibited from making such disclosures. 12 While HIPAA protects data that can
identify individuals, like their name, address, birth date, and Social Security
Number, it does not protect de-identified data. 13 If, for example, a health care
provider—perhaps a public health agency providing care—removes all
individual identifiers from data related to COVID-19 cases, HIPAA specifically
states that its requirements no longer apply. 14 Moreover, “HIPAA itself
contemplates that even for covered entities, extreme public health
circumstances, like the COVID-19 pandemic, might warrant release of personal
health information.” 15 HIPAA also allows for the release of PHI where
disclosure is “required by law.” 16 In these cases, federal and state freedom of
information laws may allow for the release of valuable public health
information—though exemptions within the federal Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), which call for the concealment of certain records if federal statute so
states, may cause confusion. 17 Despite potential stumbling blocks in dealing
with federal and state confidentiality and information release laws, the HIPAA
provisions are a saving grace for public health authorities and other covered
entities fielding questions from reporters, concerned parents, and the general
public related to COVID-19 outbreaks and hotspots.
HIPAA’s privacy provisions, as discussed in this Article, are a source of
great confusion for data-keepers, including government and other health care
Coronavirus Cases, Asks Patients to Do Contract Tracing, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Nov. 16, 2020,
5:54 PM), https://news.stlpublicradio.org/health-science-environment/2020-11-16/st-louis-countysets-record-for-coronavirus-cases-asks-patients-to-do-contact-tracing.
9. Levin, supra note 2.
10. OFF. FOR C.R., SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 1 (2003), https://www.hhs.gov/
sites/default/files/privacysummary.pdf [hereinafter HIPAA Summary].
11. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2020).
12. Id.
13. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(d)(2), 164.514(a)–(b) (2019).
14. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2).
15. Al-Amyn Sumar & Chuck Tobin, Coronavirus Tests the Commitment to Government
Transparency, LITIG., Summer 2020, at 10, 11.
16. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a) (2019).
17. Catherine J. Cameron, Jumping Off the Merry-Go-Round: How the Federal Courts Will
Reconcile the Circular Deference Problem Between HIPAA and FOIA, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 333,
335 (2009); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).
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entities. These data-keepers may be erring on the side of secrecy to avoid risking
a HIPAA violation by releasing information which is not properly de-identified
or which has incorrectly been sorted under a PHI exception; because HIPAA’s
provisions leave room for interpretation, data-keepers may face confusion
regarding what can and cannot be shared with the public. 18 Still, the hesitancy
to issue data which are clearly de-identified or subject to a HIPAA exception is
hurting the efforts of those same public health officials to mitigate the spread of
COVID-19. 19
Journalists and public health trade organizations have created guidance
documents to help the two groups navigate HIPAA-related hurdles. 20
Unfortunately, lacking legal force, such guidance has proven fruitless. 21 In order
to address confusion, and even inconsistency, it is imperative that the agency
responsible for sanctioning privacy offenses—namely, the federal Office for
Civil Rights (OCR) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—
issue guidance explaining HIPAA’s boundaries and interactions with state and
federal sunshine laws. By doing so, OCR can promote access to COVID-19
information within HIPAA’s privacy framework.
Part II of this Article explores the impact of blocking access to public health
information on the spread of COVID-19. Part III then provides an in-depth
definition of the HIPAA Privacy Rule and its boundaries. Part IV describes the
historical battle between reporters and public agencies for access to public health
records, including applicable litigation. Part V details the potential interactions
between freedom of information statutes and the “required by law” exception,
in addition to the problems posed by state privacy laws. Finally, Part VI
recommends that OCR produce guidance documents to help members of the
media and health care entities strike a balance between protecting the privacy of
individuals and sharing lifesaving public health information.
II. DATA SHIELDING BY HEALTH CARE AGENCIES DURING THE COVID-19
PANDEMIC
Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, health care agencies largely kept
the public in the dark about emerging hotspots. Meanwhile, the disease spread.
At one point, nearly one million Americans tested COVID-positive in one day. 22

18. See, e.g., Jesse Pines et al., 10 Times HIPAA May Not Apply, EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS
MONTHLY (Sept. 1, 2015), https://epmonthly.com/article/10-times-hipaa-may-not-apply/;
Stateside Staff, HIPAA and You: Erring on the Side of Caution, MICH. RADIO (Aug. 11, 2015, 4:24
PM), https://www.michiganradio.org/post/hipaa-and-you-erring-side-caution.
19. Pfannenstiel, supra note 8.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part II.
22. COVID Data Tracker, Trends in Number of COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in the US
Reported to CDC, by State/Territory, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
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A report provided to the Wichita Eagle by the Columbia University Brown
Institute for Media Innovation exemplifies the detrimental impact of such
secrecy. The report outlined a list of hotspots health officials actively hid from
the public. 23 In a May 2020 email from the Kansas Department of Health and
Environment to public health officials, the department, in bold and underlined
writing, told officials, “Please do not distribute this list further and please do not
make the names of facilities outside of your county known publicly.” 24 But
outbreaks in churches, nursing homes, prisons, and even keg parties took their
toll statewide. 25 In response to reporter inquiries, the Kansas health department,
despite warning public health officials that the data was not meant to be shared,
deferred to counties to make their own decisions regarding data publicity,
apparently switching course, displacing responsibility, and at the very least,
inciting confusion among reporters and public health officials alike. 26
Unfortunately, the response in Kansas is not unique. Universities, school
districts, employers, and public health agencies nationwide have declined to
release COVID-19 infection information, citing the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 27 The
University of Alabama and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill each
claimed that HIPAA prohibited the release of information about the incidence
of COVID-19 on their campuses. 28 Tesla and the Alameda County Public Health
Department also declined to share how many Tesla plant workers were infected
with COVID-19. 29 In June 2020, Alameda County had the highest COVID-19
outbreak in all of Northern California. 30
The lack of COVID-19 hotspot information, however, is met by a fierce
thirst for information by both reporters and the general public. Parents across the
country have expressed concern that they cannot make informed decisions about
sending their children to school because the schools are declining to share

https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#trends_dailytrendscases (last visited Jan. 6, 2022) (Select
“View (left axis): Daily Cases” to show the daily total COVID case reports).
23. Jonathan Shorman et al., Secret Document Lists Locations of Kansas Coronavirus
Outbreaks. Here’s What It Says, WICHITA EAGLE (June 8, 2020, 7:50 AM), https://www.kansas
.com/news/coronavirus/article243305606.html.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Meryl Kornfield, Universities Can’t Use Privacy Laws to Withhold Data on Coronavirus
Outbreaks, Experts Say, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/educa
tion/2020/09/02/college-coronavirus-privacy-laws/.
28. Id.
29. Russ Mitchell, Why You’re Being Left in the Dark About Coronavirus Hot Spots in Your
Area, L.A. TIMES (June 15, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-0615/companies-like-tesla-wont-report-coronavirus-cases-why-arent-the-numbers-public.
30. Id.
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disease information. 31 A Texas pediatrician said she could determine the safety
of sending children to daycare, if only she had “a few more numbers.” 32 Based
on her experience, the answers to the questions reporters, parents, physicians,
and the public-at-large are asking are within reach if data transparency improves.
The fear then becomes that, as access to lifesaving data that people can use to
identify personal risks associated with their private-life actions becomes
restricted, so does the trust in government and health officials who, without
disclosing COVID-19 hotspot information, ask the public to blindly trust their
warnings and greatly restrict their day-to-day lives.
III. HIPAA AND ITS BOUNDARIES
Despite a clear desire from members of the public to make data-informed
decisions regarding their movements during the peak of the COVID-19
pandemic, agencies shielded such information, citing HIPAA. HIPAA’s privacy
provisions continue to cause confusion, even for experts. 33 Whether an entity is
bound by law, whether data is considered “protected health information” as
defined below, or even whether data containing protected health information can
be released as-is, under an exception to the Privacy Rule, or in a “de-identified”
state is a dizzying set of inquiries. The legal complexity may be exactly why
schools, public health entities, and government officials err on the side of
privacy, even where such sharing could prove lifesaving; simply put, secrecy
may be an expression of the adage, “Better safe than sorry.”
The frequent citation of HIPAA by agencies as a barrier to sharing public
information requires an exploration of the information HIPAA does and does
not protect. HIPAA, enacted in 1996 and effective in 2001, requires certain
privacy measures and disclosure protections of electronic information. 34 HIPAA
applies to covered entities—health care providers, health plans, and
clearinghouses—and their business associates, including subcontractors. 35
Under HIPAA, certain information which is individually identifiable is shielded
from public disclosure. 36 This information is called “protected health

31. Levin, supra note 2; Aliyya Swaby, Texas Parents Face a Frightening Lack of Information
on Coronavirus Risks in Child Care Centers, TEX. TRIB. (July 9, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2020/07/09/texas-day-care-coronavirus-risks/.
32. Swaby, supra note 31.
33. Colleen Flaherty, Gag Order or Privacy Concern?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 31, 2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/08/31/colleges-want-professors-stay-mum-studentcovid-19-cases (HIPAA privacy experts shared concerns that even if HIPAA did not apply to
disclosures of student COVID-19-positive tests, the Federal Educational Rights Privacy Act
(FERPA) may prohibit these disclosures).
34. 45 C.F.R. § 164.104(a) (2019); see generally HIPAA Summary, supra note 10.
35. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.103, 164.500(a) (2019).
36. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2020).
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information,” or PHI. 37 PHI includes “individually identifiable health
information,” electronic or otherwise, which a covered entity or business
associate handles. 38 It includes demographic data relating to a person’s health
condition, their own provision of health care, and payment for that provision of
care. 39 HHS provides examples of individually identifiable health information:
names, birth dates, addresses, and Social Security numbers. 40 Generally, HIPAA
regulates how PHI can be used and disclosed to individuals, including when
disclosure is permissible for treatment, payment, and health care operations. 41
Importantly, HIPAA does not regulate de-identified information. 42 “Health
information that does not identify an individual and with respect to which there
is no reasonable basis to believe that the information can be used to identify an
individual is not individually identifiable health information.” 43 In other words,
information that cannot identify the specific people from which it stems is not
restricted from public disclosure under HIPAA. 44 Public health entities can deidentify data in two ways: either by employing an expert who can determine that
data is not individually identifiable or by removing eighteen individual
identifiers from the data. 45 In the first case, a person with “appropriate
knowledge of and experience with generally accepted statistical and scientific
principles” would review data and determine there is a “very small” risk of its
use for individually identifying a person. 46 The second method would require
the removal of individual identifiers like names, birth dates, and Social Security
numbers, among other identifiers. 47 Therefore, in the case where, for example,
a school district wishes to share the number of active COVID-19 cases among
faculty and staff, such information could easily be de-identified to fall outside
of HIPAA’s limitations through the use of a statistician’s expertise. Some
parents seem to understand these rules; Cynthia Johnston, a self-identified mom
of two, took to Twitter to question her child’s school, which emailed parents that
a high school student tested positive for COVID-19, but did not provide any
additional information. 48 Johnston questioned,

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. HIPAA Summary, supra note 10, at 4.
41. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a) (2019).
42. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a) (2019).
43. Id.
44. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(d)(2), 164.514(a)–(b).
45. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1)–(2).
46. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1).
47. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2).
48. Cynthia Johnston (@cdjohnst), TWITTER (Aug. 13, 2021, 5:08 PM), https://twitter.com/
cdjohnst/status/1426304691290316801.
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How is that even helpful? … I feel like the school could say: Your child has
been in a class with a person who tested Covid positive. Or your child has a
common lunch period with a person who tested positive. Since there are like 45+
kids in each class it’s not like they are breaking confidentiality. 49

The first de-identification method also becomes particularly useful when
releasing information by zip code, which may be pertinent in the discussion of
COVID-19 hotspot data. While zip codes are an identifying feature which can
be removed along with other individual identifiers, a zip code does not have to
be removed from data for it to constitute de-identified information, as long as an
expert has confirmed the data is, indeed, de-identified. 50
Though seemingly simple, the idea of “de-identification” clearly leads to
frustration for data-keepers and data-seekers alike because the analysis is factspecific and high-risk. If an entity does not sufficiently de-identify data, it is at
risk of accruing federal fines. 51 In some cases, the sample size may be small
enough—for example, in a small town—that entities worry those familiar with
the sample population will be able to readily identify the subjects of the data.52
Or it is possible the process of determining HIPAA applicability and how to
properly de-identify is so daunting or resource-consuming, an entity chooses to
mark the data private under HIPAA rather than go through the exercise of
determining whether and how it can be released. Of course, the journalist
battling for public records is likely tempted to take the cynical view, and it is
true that in some instances, data-keepers shield public information in bad faith.
It is also likely true, however, that in most cases, the law has caused such
confusion, and the risk is so much greater than the reward that privacy simply
becomes the only seemingly reasonable outlet.
Where de-identification is not possible, HIPAA contemplates the disclosure
even of PHI for public health purposes. 53 Although HIPAA permits—not
requires—these disclosures, 54 at the least, the exception undermines claims by
public health agencies that HIPAA categorically prohibits the disclosure of all
COVID-19 data. Under this exception, those receiving data must enter into a
49. Id.
50. Many agencies release health statistics organized by zip code, and to suggest that each of
these agencies is violating HIPAA’s Privacy Rule is an absurd conclusion. See, e.g., COVID-19
Statistics, ILL. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH, https://dph.illinois.gov/covid19/data.html (last visited Jan. 6,
2022).
51. HIPAA Summary, supra note 10, at 17.
52. See, e.g., Mary Constantine, Did a Roane County EMS Worker Break Federal Law with a
Facebook Post About an Emergency Call?, KNOX NEWS (May 30, 2018, 4:23 PM),
https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/2018/05/30/hipaa-law-violations-tennessee-paramedicroane-county-ems/655603002/ (where the wife of a man who died in a chicken coop argued her
husband’s HIPAA rights were violated by a Facebook post where an EMS worker noted only the
location of death, but in a small town where “everyone knows where my husband died.”).
53. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e) (2019); HIPAA Summary, supra note 10, at 9.
54. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e); HIPAA Summary, supra note 10, at 9.
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data use agreement for what is termed a “limited data set.” 55 Limited data sets
can be used “only for the purposes of research, public health, or health care
operations.” 56 While it is fathomable that a newspaper reporter could use such
data for the purpose of COVID-19-related research, a parent curious about the
number of COVID-19 cases at his child’s school district likely could not rely on
this exception to obtain data otherwise protected under HIPAA.
Finally, HIPAA contemplates disclosure of PHI where it is “required by
law.” For example, disclosure may be contemplated under freedom of
information laws, as discussed in detail in the next section. 57 This becomes
especially important in cases where state public information or public health
laws call for the disclosure of data otherwise protected under HIPAA’s PHI
provision. 58
HIPAA does not provide citizens a private right of action but allows OCR
to execute civil monetary penalties against covered entities and their business
associates for violations. 59 According to HHS, the Privacy Rule “assure[s] that
individuals’ health information is properly protected while allowing the flow of
health information needed to provide and promote high quality health care and
to protect the public’s health and well being.” 60 The rule, according to HHS,
“strikes a balance that permits important uses of information, while protecting
the privacy of people who seek care and healing.” 61
IV. HISTORICAL TOOLS TO COMBAT PUBLIC INFORMATION BLOCKING
The public’s thirst for information—and reporters’ battle for it in the face of
HIPAA regulations and despite its exceptions—predates COVID-19. A decade
ago, the Association of Health Care Journalists teamed up with the National
Association of County and City Health Officials and the Association of State
and Territorial Health Officials to create guidance “for journalists and public
health officials to consult when decisions must be made about what information
should be released about deaths, epidemics, emerging diseases or illnesses.” 62
The guidelines explain:
The meeting was prompted by the wide variation in information released by state
and local public health officials about people in their localities who died in the
55. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(1).
56. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e)(3).
57. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a) (2019).
58. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (West 2007) (amended 2018); State ex rel.
Cincinnati Enquirer v. Daniels, 844 N.E.2d 1181, 1183, 1186 (Ohio 2006).
59. HIPAA Summary, supra note 10, at 17.
60. HIPAA Summary, supra note 10.
61. Id.
62. Guidance on the Release of Information Concerning Deaths, Epidemics or Emerging
Diseases, ASS’N HEALTH CARE JOURNALISTS, https://healthjournalism.org/releaseguidance (last
visited Jan. 6, 2022).
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H1N1 pandemic of 2009. The disparate approaches – with some jurisdictions
releasing specific information about the age, gender and residence of victims
and others releasing little or no personal information – became the subject of
news reports, distracting from health messages and inadvertently undermining
public trust. 63

The document, though thorough and compiled through the collaboration of
journalists and health professionals, is an example of why trade organizations
cannot solve the problem of public health information shielding. To put it
simply, if such guidance documents exist—and this example does not stand
alone 64—and health care entities continue to deny access to public health data
under the guise of HIPAA protection, 65 it suggests that decision-makers at health
care entities and public health agencies are not interested in what journalists or
trade organizations have to say because those entities do not have enforcement
power.
Moreover, guidelines exist for reporters to learn to navigate conversations
with public officials who regularly inaccurately cite HIPAA, or its privacy rule
“cousin,” the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), as a means
of withholding information. 66 Still, agencies are quick to deny public records
requests, citing these laws—though obtaining public information not only helps
inform the general citizenry about issues which may impact their health and
well-being, but acts as a tool for the public to hold its taxpayer-funded servicepeople accountable. 67 The existence of guidelines related to this very topic, and
the simultaneous continuation of a trend toward unsupported secrecy and
privacy, suggests guidelines created by any agency other than the enforcer of
penalties—here, OCR—cannot effectively turn the tide toward accurate datasharing which is both HIPAA-compliant and for the benefit of public health.
Public information denials have been the subject of many lawsuits by
newspapers seeking to compel turnover of information deemed public under
state law. 68 In State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Daniels, the Supreme Court
of Ohio compelled the Cincinnati Health Department to grant the Cincinnati
Enquirer access to copies of 173 citations for lead contamination issued to
63. Id.
64. Understanding HIPAA: A Brief Overview, ASS’N HEALTH CARE JOURNALISTS,
https://healthjournalism.org/resources-tips-details.php?id=12#.YBIVUuhKibi (last visited Jan. 6,
2022) (noting that both OCR and the American Hospital Association have promulgated HIPAA
guidance); Annie Waldman, How Health and Education Journalists Can Turn Privacy Laws to
Their Advantage, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 19, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how
-health-and-education-journalists-can-turn-privacy-laws-to-their-advantage (providing various
strategies and resources reporters can use to gain information while still complying with HIPAA).
65. See supra Parts II and III.
66. Waldman, supra note 64.
67. See id. (noting that these laws are often used as barricades against disclosing information
that is vital to public interest).
68. E.g., State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Daniels, 844 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (Ohio 2006).
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single-family residence owners. 69 More recently, an Arizona state court
dismissed a lawsuit against the Arizona Department of Health Services and its
director by several news organizations which requested access to the number of
COVID-19 cases at nursing homes in the state. 70 News organizations in North
Carolina, Mississippi, and Idaho, to name a few, have filed similar lawsuits
seeking COVID-19-related records from government agencies. 71 Though
lawsuits may be one avenue to obtaining information owed to the public, they
are an option of last resort. The attorneys representing media groups in North
Carolina said they spent weeks negotiating with agency attorneys for public data,
to no avail. 72 Lawsuits take time, are costly, and, as the Arizona nursing home
lawsuit shows, do not always result in access to public data, a major drawback
in comparison to establishing a culture of responsible information sharing.
This leaves news organizations as the primary and sometimes only outlet for
what should be publicly accessible information. In Iowa, for example, it is the
Department of Public Health’s policy to release outbreak information at
businesses only to media and only if they request it. 73 It is a practice which leaves
reporters, the public’s watchdogs, as the only source of information—and it
shows that, in some instances, only reporters have the leverage necessary to
obtain lifesaving public health information.
In areas where at least some data was made available to news organizations
to track COVID-19 cases, news organizations proved how influential that access

69. Id. at 1184, 1188.
70. Civil Court Case Information – Case History, JUD. BRANCH ARIZ. MARICOPA CNTY.,
http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/CivilCourtCases/caseInfo.asp?caseNumber=CV2
020-005385 (last visited July 3, 2021); Complaint for Statutory Special Action to Secure Right to
Inspect and Copy Public Records at 2, Phoenix Newspapers Inc., v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs.,
No. CV2020-005385 (Ariz. Super. May 5, 2020), 2020 WL 2303032.
71. Kate Martin et al., Media Coalition Sues Cooper, Cabinet Agencies for COVID-19
Records, CITIZEN TIMES (May 28, 2020, 9:00 PM), https://www.citizen-times.com/story/news/
local/2020/05/28/media-coalition-sues-cooper-cabinet-agencies-covid-19-records-asheville-law
suit/5280275002/; Emily Wagster Pettus, Judge: Health Dept. Must Respond to Public Records
Request, CLARION LEDGER (May 27, 2020, 11:52 AM), https://www.clarionledger.com/story/
news/2020/05/27/mississippi-health-dept-must-respond-public-records-request/5265004002/;
Idaho Newspaper Plans Lawsuit over COVID-19 Records Denial, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 29,
2020), https://apnews.com/article/9ffa69ff4001cc8a48b98202d041bcd1.
72. Martin et al., supra note 71.
73. Pfannenstiel, supra note 8. In addition, the Texas Health and Human Services Commission
gives case data in childcare centers to reporters who ask, but it will not publish the data online,
confusingly, citing state privacy laws. See Swaby, supra note 31.
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was in sharing lifesaving information. 74 In a listicle 75 published April 2020—
just one month into a widespread national shutdown in response to the
pandemic—the Knight Foundation, a non-profit foundation supporting free
press, detailed all the reasons local journalists were essential to COVID-19
mitigation efforts. 76 Among a long list, the Knight Foundation first pointed to
journalists who leveraged their data-scouting and analysis resources to assemble
community hotspot maps and datasets. 77 For example, in New York City, nonprofit news organization The City used emergency room admission data to track
tests, cases, and hospitalizations by age and zip code. 78 Without their tool, the
public had no way to access case information in their own neighborhoods. 79
V. THE HIPAA “REQUIRED BY LAW” EXCEPTION AND STATE PRIVACY LAWS
At the crux of many information-seeking lawsuits filed by newspapers are
freedom of information laws at the federal and state levels, which interact with
HIPAA’s “required by law” exception, often causing confusion for
recordkeepers who must decide which law to apply. 80 Specifically, because both
the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and HIPAA defer to the other,
determining applicability becomes problematic. 81 Generally, FOIA states that
government records are public unless they fall into an enumerated exception. 82
Exemption Six requires concealment of medical records that would cause an
“unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 83 FOIA’s Exemption Three is also
relevant here; it allows government agencies to shield records if another federal
statute “establishes particular criteria for withholding” them. 84 Not all health
care providers covered under HIPAA will fall into FOIA’s purview, but several
important ones in the time of COVID-19 do: namely, the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention and state and local public health agencies, all of which
collect communicable disease reports, including COVID-19 data. 85

74. Mark Glaser, 6 Ways Local News Makes a Crucial Impact Covering COVID-19, KNIGHT
FOUND. (Apr. 20, 2020), https://knightfoundation.org/articles/6-ways-local-news-makes-a-crucialimpact-covering-covid-19/.
75. A “listicle” is defined by Merriam-Webster as “an article consisting of a series of items
presented as a list.” Listicle, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictio
nary/listicle (last visited Jan. 6, 2022).
76. Glaser, supra note 74.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Cameron, supra note 17, at 335–36.
81. Id.
82. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A).
83. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6); Cameron, supra note 17, at 341.
84. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(A)(ii); Cameron, supra note 17, at 341.
85. Cameron, supra note 17, at 342.
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The 2006 Ohio Supreme Court Cincinnati Enquirer case, in which the court
ordered the release of lead contamination citations, 86 provides an example of the
interaction between HIPAA and state freedom of information laws. The court
considered the conflict between the Ohio Public Records Act—the state’s
sunshine law—and the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 87 The court found the requested
records did not contain PHI and that HIPAA’s Privacy Rule was, therefore,
inapplicable to the records. 88 Though it could have terminated its examination
here, it continued to consider how the Ohio law would interact with records that
do contain PHI. 89 According to the court, “even if the records did contain
protected health information, they would still be subject to release in accordance
with the ‘required by law’ exception to HIPAA.” 90 “[W]e are confronted here
with a problem of circular reference,” the court explained, “because the Ohio
Public Records Act requires disclosure of information unless prohibited by
federal law, while federal law allows disclosure of protected health information
if required by state law.” 91 The court concluded, “the Ohio Public Records Law
requires disclosure of these reports, and HIPAA does not supersede state
disclosure requirements.” 92 More than being an example of the interaction
between HIPAA and FOIA, the case serves as an example that even records
which contain PHI are subject to laws mandating disclosure.
The Cincinnati Enquirer case has not been cited in connection with a
COVID-19-related public records request, perhaps because since that case was
decided (and others like it), 93 the Ohio state legislature amended its public
records law to exclude PHI from its definition of “public records.” 94 Though
undermined in Ohio by the state law amendment, the “required by law”
exception to HIPAA privacy still exists on a federal level and may be viable in
states that have not taken steps to exclude PHI from their public records laws. In
circumstances where a state FOIA bars access to PHI, it may still be possible to
obtain information from a public health entity, which is allowed, under HIPAA’s
privacy exceptions, to disclose information to people potentially exposed to a
communicable disease. 95
86. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Daniels, 844 N.E.2d 1181, 1189 (Ohio 2006).
87. Id. at 1183.
88. Id. at 1186.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Cincinnati Enquirer, 844 N.E.2d at 1187.
92. Id. at 1188.
93. See, e.g., Abbott v. Tex. Dep’t Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 212 S.W.3d 648, 651
(Tex. App. 2006).
94. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43 (West 2018), invalidated by State v. Delvallie, 2021Ohio-1809, 173 N.E.3d 544 (the court held on a criminal law issue, which falls outside the scope
of this Article).
95. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(iv) (2019); OFF. FOR C.R., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS.,
DISCLOSURES
FOR
PUBLIC
HEALTH
ACTIVITIES
3
(2003),
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Besides HIPAA, certain state-enacted privacy laws contribute to difficulties
accessing public health data. 96 Though these laws protect personal privacy, they
also impede reasonable efforts to release public health data. These state laws
will provide an obstacle to information-seekers even with a clear interpretation
of HIPAA that favors public data release, and when strictly interpreted, these
laws may interfere with the balance between privacy and public health. 97
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
If there is any clear consensus regarding HIPAA’s privacy provisions, it is
only that its applicability is a source of great confusion. Even in cases where
HIPAA contemplates the release of PHI or de-identified data, determining to
what extent data must be altered to be sufficiently de-identified serves as a block
to data release. Such ambiguity may be the reason HIPAA’s Privacy Rule is so
often incorrectly cited; rather than risk releasing data, which is not sufficiently
de-identified, organizations will choose (perhaps not surprisingly so) to refuse
to provide potentially lifesaving information. Though private entities, such as
trade organizations, have created guidance documents resolving at least some of
these ambiguities, 98 the problem of incorrect HIPAA citation persists. Frankly,
though these guidance documents may be useful for journalists as an educational
tool when pressing health care entities for data, the documents carry no legal
force in the face of discipline for HIPAA violation and cost valuable resources
to develop. Despite fast-paced advances in COVID-19 vaccine dissemination,
we will face disease outbreaks again, as evidenced by the virus’ resurgence in
the form of its Delta variant, the predominant COVID-19 virus strain in the
United States by July 2021, and later, its Omicron variant. 99 It is therefore
imperative that public health entities are equipped with the tools they need to
properly and promptly release data which can help the public make informed
choices which better the health of the United States population.

https://www.hhsgov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/publichealth/pub
lichealth.pdf. Ultimately, the circular deference between FOIA and HIPAA remains problematic
but falls beyond the scope of this article.
96. See Health Privacy: Disclosure of Medical Information Chart, BLOOMBERG L.,
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/bbna/chart/41/403/d78fe3e5fa95897ba62326e22ff
caf14 (last visited Mar. 10, 2021). This source is created from Bloomberg Chart Builder, using
“Disclosure of Medical Information” for all fifty states and D.C. including topics “Applicable Law”
and “Confidentiality and Consent to Disclose.”
97. See id.; see, e.g., King v. Cook County Health and Hospitals Systems, No. 1-19-0925,
2020 WL 3287316, at *1 (Ill. App. June 18, 2020). The issue of state privacy law falls outside the
scope of this article.
98. See supra Part IV.
99. COVID Data Tracker, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://covid.cdc
.gov/covid-data-tracker/#variant-proportions (last updated Jan. 4, 2022).
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OCR, as the enforcing agency of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, is in a unique
position to provide useful guidance to covered entities, business associates, and
public agencies generally to explain which data can be freely provided to the
public. First, because OCR is the enforcement agency doling out civil monetary
penalties to organizations which breach HIPAA laws, it may be that guidance
issued by OCR has more influence than that drafted by other interested
organizations, including trade groups. 100 Second, OCR is well-versed in the
arena of guidance issuance and can take language from existing documents and
tailor it to address media members and entities handling public record
requests. 101 Finally, by providing guidance which favors disclosure, OCR can
signal to health care entities that public information access is possible while
maintaining privacy. This is, perhaps, the most notable impact of such guidance.
Easing the fears of legal and compliance personnel within covered health entities
can open access to lifesaving data, which in turn can help curb the spread of
COVID-19 or other infectious disease outbreaks and lessen the impact of future
public health emergencies.
In addition to guidance drafted by organizations like the Association of
Health Care Journalists, Poynter, and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press, which are generally informative and thorough, OCR has authored its
own guidance documents. 102 Therefore, much of OCR’s task is already
complete. Moreover, in May 2020, OCR released guidance for health
professionals on handling media requests related to COVID-19. 103 The guidance
is laid out in an easy-to understand, question-and-answer format, including
references to the HIPAA rule. 104 This existing guidance, however, does not
address the issue outlined in this Article. While OCR anticipated questions
related to filming patients in health care settings, it did not anticipate that
questions regarding de-identification of statistical information would arise in
HIPAA’s grey areas, and the guidance is limited to two pages in length,
answering only three hypothetical, HIPAA-related questions. 105 OCR should

100. HIPAA Summary, supra note 10, at 17.
101. In December 2020, OCR issued guidance to help health insurance exchanges understand
how it could disclose COVID-19-related PHI for public health purposes. OFF. FOR C.R., HIPAA,
HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGES, AND DISCLOSURES OF PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION
FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PURPOSES (2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hie-faqs.pdf.
102. Id. at 2; OFF. FOR C.R., GUIDANCE ON COVERED HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND
RESTRICTIONS ON MEDIA ACCESS TO PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION ABOUT INDIVIDUALS IN
THEIR FACILITIES (2020), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/guidance-on-media-and-filmcrews-access-to-phi.pdf [hereinafter OCR Media Guidance]; Adam A. Marshall & Gunita Singh,
Journalists’ Guide to HIPAA During the COVID-19 Health Crisis, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM
PRESS (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.rcfp.org/covid-19-journalists-hipaa-guide/.
103. OCR Media Guidance, supra note 102, at 1.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1–2.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

198

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 15:183

build off its existing media guidance to help covered health entities understand
how to release information that is HIPAA compliant.
OCR’s guidance should address three distinct methods of data release that
balance the privacy of individuals and the health of the public. First, OCR’s
guidance should outline methods of compliant data de-identification of PHI,
using prototypical examples of media and public data requests to guide its
recommendations. The HIPAA Privacy Rule outlines two methods for deidentification. 106 Under the first, a health care entity can remove a list of eighteen
identifiers. 107 Though effective, this can slim down the content of the data
request to the point that the data’s value is lost. Accordingly, OCR should clarify
who will qualify as “a person with appropriate knowledge of and experience
with generally accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods for
rendering information not individually identifiable” under the law. 108 Whether a
health care entity, newspaper, or trade organization—like the Association for
Health Care Journalists—retains the services of such a statistician, either
privately or through a local university, for example, OCR’s guidance could open
doors for health care entities and media to work together to promote the flow of
public information. Moreover, guidance will re-enforce trust in public health
among the general population by clarifying which types of professionals will be
able to make a determination under the law. These guidelines, by showing the
accessibility of an expert de-identification determination, can serve both as
permission to covered health entities to release public health data—whether it
constitutes PHI or not—and as a reminder of the value of such data.
Second, OCR should clarify that HIPAA’s “required by law” exception
allows for the release of PHI where state laws—statute, regulation, or court
order—so require, and such disclosures do not constitute HIPAA violations. 109
Though OCR does not enforce FOIA compliance, it has explained this
interaction of state public information laws and HIPAA. 110 Similar language in
future guidance documents created by OCR to guide covered health entities in
data release activities would be appropriate.
Finally, even in situations where the “required by law” exception is
inapplicable, in some instances, disclosure will be appropriate and not in
violation of HIPAA based on other HIPAA provisions. For example, though
likely out of reach for the average parent seeking COVID-19-related school
106. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b) (2019).
107. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2).
108. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1).
109. HIPAA Summary, supra note 10, at 6–7.
110. Off. for C.R., State Public Records Laws, Also Known as Open Records or Freedom of
Information Laws, All Provide for Certain Public Access to Government Records. How Does the
HIPAA Privacy Rule Relate to These State Laws?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/506/how-does-the-hipaa-rule-relate-to-freedomof-information-laws/index.html (last reviewed July 26, 2013).
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district data, HIPAA’s “limited data set” exception may be beneficial for
reporters. Per this rule, “[a] limited data set may be used and disclosed for . . .
public health purposes, provided the recipient enters into a data use agreement
promising specified safeguards for the protected health information within the
limited data set.” 111 This may have been pertinent in Kansas, for example, where
the state Department of Health and Education kept COVID-19 outbreak data
from the public as people fell ill and died. 112 Instead, state officials and a local
newspaper—perhaps the Wichita Eagle, which eventually broke the news
story—could have created a safe channel of data communication which was
HIPAA compliant and in favor of public safety ahead of the disease’s spread.
Ultimately, OCR is uniquely positioned to help covered health entities strike
a delicate balance between protecting the privacy of their patients and aiding in
the furtherance of public health. Current OCR guidelines act as a deterrent to
public information sharing. When the enforcement agency warns only against
information sharing and does not explain when information sharing is
appropriate, it sends one message: “Sharing public health information will be
sanctioned.” To be clear, this is not a simple balance to strike. Given the unique
nature of each data request, there cannot be a bright-line rule to easily determine
when data should be released. This obstacle does not warrant ignorance,
however. Because OCR makes the final call regarding what warrants penalty
under HIPAA, only OCR can give covered entities the OK to publicize data it
would otherwise hide behind the excuse of privacy.
VII. CONCLUSION
Finding the balance between securing individuals’ privacy rights and
helping the public make educated health decisions—in the midst of the deadliest
pandemic the United States has faced in a century—is a difficult task without a
clear-cut rule. However, the history and continuing practice of shielding
COVID-19 hotspot data out of fear its revelation could lead to sanctions must
end. Health care entities, school districts, and other organizations that could help
the general public make informed decisions regarding the places they go during
the pandemic have a duty to use that information for the public good. Moreover,
the HIPAA Privacy Rule, often cited as the legal roadblock to such data release,
itself contemplates and allows for this data sharing. 113 It is now up to OCR to
take the initiative, to recognize the role only it can play in alleviating this
longstanding problem, and to release a guidance document that provides the
permission its covered entities lack today to open access to COVID-19 hotspot
data. If OCR could save even one life from COVID-19—much less, slow the

111. HIPAA Summary, supra note 10, at 9.
112. Shorman et al., supra note 23.
113. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(1) (2019); Sumar & Tobin, supra note 15.
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spread of the disease and others like it to come—by releasing a guidance
document, it will have been worth it.
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